Introduction
Standard models of …scal federalism predict that grants received by local governments should be considered equivalent to increases in the income of the local constituency. Perhaps the most commonly studied violation of this fungibility principle is the ‡ypaper anomaly: the empirical observation that money "sticks where it hits." Local governments spend more from intergovernmental grants than from equivalent increases in constituent income, and grants for particular programs tend to increase spending on those programs far more than standard theory suggests. Numerous studies have documented the existence of ‡ypaper e¤ects, with estimates of the increase in local spending arising from a dollar grant ranging from 25 cents to one dollar (Hines and Thaler 1995) . 1 I propose a new, rational model of government spending decisions that focuses on the potential role of special interest groups in in ‡uencing the allocation of public funds. In this model, special interest groups have the ability to raise funds for local governments by undertaking costly e¤ort.
In a dynamic setting, it is optimal for rational politicians to take the preferences of these interest groups into account when making spending decisions to ensure that groups have incentives to undertake the e¤ort costs of raising funds in the future. I test the predictions of the model by examining the response of state spending on tobacco prevention and control programs to receipt of windfalls arising from state lawsuits against the tobacco industry.
There are few theories in the existing literature that can explain observed violations of fungibility. Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal (1982) propose a model in which agenda-setting bureaucrats are able to hide grants from voters. While this model predicts that money received by governments will remain at the government level, it does little to explain why categorical grants should systematically increase expenditure in particular spending categories. Models focusing on rent seeking by public o¢ cials (Inman 1979) , …scal illusion (Oates 1979 ), voter uncertainty (Turnbull 1992) , possible di¤erences in the tax burden of the average versus median voter (Fisher 1982) or the deadweight costs associated with raising tax revenue (Hamilton 1986 ) similarly predict that grants should produce a greater increase in government spending than equal increases in constituent income but make no predictions about the allocation of spending across categories. Hines and Thaler (1995) argue that these e¤ects can be explained by voter mental accounting; however, I present evidence that is di¢ cult to reconcile with a simple mental accounting story.
Two studies explicitly consider the processes by which grants received by local governments are determined and the potential role of such processes in generating violations of fungibility across spending categories. Chernick (1979) argues that granting agencies allocate project grants to communities willing to commit more local funds to the project, creating implicit matching requirements even for lump sum grants. Knight (2002) proposes a legislative bargaining model in which a bargaining process at the federal level leads to endogenous grants that re ‡ect local spending preferences. Applying this model to federal highway grants, he …nds that instrumenting for grants with measures of political bargaining power eliminates apparent ‡ypaper e¤ects.
I focus instead on the interaction between special interest groups and government. A substantial literature exists addressing the role of special interest groups in in ‡uencing political decisionmaking. However, to the best of my knowledge, existing work has not considered the potential in ‡uence of special interest groups on local spending in the …scal federalism context. 2 I exploit unusual features of windfalls that states received as a result of a 1998 settlement with the tobacco industry to test the special interest group model against alternative hypotheses. The tobacco settlement agreement resolved multiple lawsuits …led by states against the tobacco industry during the 1990s. Under the terms of the settlement, tobacco companies must pay states large annual sums (on the order of $7 billion per year) in perpetuity. I examine the response of state spending on tobacco prevention and control programs to receipt of settlement funds.
Two key features of the settlement windfalls are advantageous for testing violations of fungibility in the allocation of funds. First, settlement money is unrestricted and use of funds is left entirely to the discretion of states. Settlement windfalls should therefore, in theory, be considered equivalent to increases in state income. Second, I demonstrate that the timing and magnitude of windfalls are plausibly exogenous to desired spending on tobacco control programs. Grants do not re ‡ect underlying spending preferences and are truly lump-sum, without explicit or implicit matching provisions. The models proposed by Chernick and Knight are therefore not applicable in this case. 3 I …nd clear evidence of violations of fungibility in government spending decisions. Average per capita spending on tobacco control programs increased more than six-fold from the …scal year before settlement revenues were received to the …scal year after receipt. The marginal propensity to spend on such programs is 0.20 from settlement revenues and zero from other income. I …nd that states that did not …le lawsuits prior to the settlement, where anti-tobacco interest groups presumably exerted less e¤ort, spend signi…cantly less on tobacco control programs after the settlement. Finally, I show that spending patterns conform closely to the predictions of the model in a world with political partisanship. Republican governors spend less than Democrats, and factors which should lead to political convergence, namely eligibility for re-election and facing an opposition controlled senate, result in increased spending by Republicans and decreased spending by Democrats.
This empirical setting di¤ers in at least two important ways from traditional empirical ‡ypaper studies. First, as mentioned, settlement revenues are unrestricted. Examining the response of spending on tobacco prevention and control programs to settlement windfalls therefore provides a test of fungibility but di¤ers from classic ‡ypaper since revenues were not speci…cally labeled for such programs. Second, transfers in this case are from private industry to local government, rather than intergovernmental transfers. While these features have advantages in distinguishing among alternative models, they also raise potential caveats in generalizing the …ndings to other settings.
I consider these issues in the concluding section of the paper.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 provides background on the settlement agreement and payments. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology and data used, and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
Interest Groups and the Allocation of Funds
"It's moral treason to me. We got all this money, then legislatures and governors who were not even in this …ght act like the money fell out of heaven and spend it on the political whim of the day." -Mississippi Attorney General Michael Moore on state decisions to spend settlement funds on non-tobacco related programs (New York Times, 2001)
Motivation
Grants-in-aid from the federal government to states are of two main types: mandatory "entitlement" grants, for which spending is determined by existing law, and discretionary grants, for which funding is allocated on an annual basis. In …scal year 2003, almost 60% of federal dollars given in grants-in-aid to states, excluding Medicaid, were discretionary. 4 In this system, interest groups have the ability to in ‡uence grants-in-aid through contributions and lobbying e¤orts. Interest groups are large contributors to federal legislators: during the 1997-1998 election cycle, over 4,500
Political Action Committees spent almost $500 million dollars and a variety of other organizations spent $1.5 billion on lobbying Washington. 5 A substantial literature (Becker 1983 , Grossman 1994 , Grossman and Helpman 2001 has shown that these groups do have the power to in ‡uence policy and the distribution of grants.
In this paper, I develop a model of how interest groups procuring funds at the federal level can in ‡uence the allocation of public funds at the local level. I de…ne an interest group broadly as any agent who has the ability to in ‡uence grants to local governments and has speci…c spending preferences that may di¤er substantially from the local median voter. 6 Why should local governments not treat these grants as fungible once they are received? I argue that this occurs as the result of a dynamic interaction between interest groups and local government. If an interest group raises funds for its preferred good and the local government does not increase spending on that good, interest groups have no incentive to undertake the costs of procuring grants. Local governments must trade o¤ the social welfare bene…t of treating funds as fungible against the cost of losing future grants.
My empirical analysis focuses on a particular case: the tobacco settlement. Similar interactions between interest groups and government, however, are common in a wide variety of settings.
Discretionary grants-in-aid to states include allocations for local health programs, environmental projects, schools, law enforcement and workforce programs, and are lobbied for by interest groups ranging from medical associations to labor unions. The model is therefore applicable to violations of fungibility in a number of contexts. 7 5 Source: The Center for Responsive Politics. www.opensecrets.org. 6 An "interest group" could also be a group within the government, as long as these two conditions are met. 7 For example, the types of interactions I describe provide one possible explanation for the ‡ypaper e¤ects observed by Evans and Owens (2005) in the COPS program.
Model
I begin with a simple stylized reputation model in which a long-run government player interacts with a number of short-run interest group players. 8 An interest group derives utility from spending on a particular good that it cares about: the "lobby good," z. It cannot produce z directly but can raise amount L for the local government by exerting e¤ort. The government chooses spending on a variety of goods, including z, conditional on funds received from the interest group and other income Y . I do not assume political agency by the government in order to demonstrate that violations of fungibility are possible even in a framework equivalent to one in which decisions are made by a median voter. I consider the implications of the model in a world with political agency and partisanship in Section 5.5.4. I make the strong assumption that lobby groups are homogeneous and that all lobby goods enter the government utility function in the same way. 9 For simplicity, I also restrict the interest group e¤ort choice to be binary.
The government makes its decision simultaneously with its interest group opponent in each period. In the case in which the government receives no funds from the interest group, it solves the following problem:
where z represents the lobby good (also a "good" in the government utility function) and x represents other government and private voter goods. Prices in this case represent the cost of production of the various goods. Solving this problem gives the optimal choice of goods, which I denote as:
(z 0 ; x 0 ). When an interest group chooses to raise funds for the government, it does so with an implicit understanding that the government will provide "payback" by spending the funds on the good the interest group cares about, z. Whether payback occurs depends on two factors: the type of the government and the action chosen by the government.
This model assumes two types of governments: Committed and Strategic. The Committed government always chooses Reciprocate. The Strategic government can choose one of two strategies:
Reciprocate or Renege. I de…ne these in the following way. Under Renege, the government breaks the implicit contract and treats the interest group funds as it would other income, maximizing
Solving this problem leads to a choice of goods along the government's income expansion path: (z 0 ; x 0 ). Under Reciprocate, the government spends all the interest group funds on the lobby good, leading to the consumption choices (b z; b x).
The government would prefer to allocate L across all goods and would therefore be better o¤ by reneging.
I assume that interest groups have utility functions such that
and U L (z 0 ;e¤ ort) < U L (z 0 ;no e¤ ort); that is, interest groups prefer to undertake e¤ort and provide L if and only if the government pays them back.
The above equations imply the following payo¤ matrix: 10 
GOVERNMENT INTEREST GROUP
Reciprocate Renege
The Nash equilibrium of the stage game is then (No E¤ ort, Renege) yielding payo¤s of (0; 0) even though (E¤ ort, Reciprocate) results in higher payo¤s (a; c) for both players. interacts with an interest group in each period. An interest group observes the past actions of the government with previous interest groups but not its type. In this setting, an interest group will put forth e¤ort if it has a su¢ ciently high belief that the government is Committed, and a Strategic government has incentives to build a reputation for being Committed by paying back interest groups. 11 The goal of the government is to maximize its discounted sum of payo¤s with a discount factor . I assume no borrowing or savings; the government must balance the budget in each period.
Intuitively, Strategic governments face the following fundamental trade-o¤: spending more on the lobby good creates a social welfare loss relative to reneging and allocating interest group funds across all goods; however, it generates a gain in the form of additional income from interest groups in the future if the government is perceived to be Committed as a result. 12 The model predicts violations of fungibility even in cases in which the government may be unlikely to interact with a particular interest group repeatedly. By reneging on any interest group, the government signals its type to all interest groups.
Solution and Comparative Statics
Suppose that the interest group's prior probability that the government is Committed is p 0 . In the one period case, the Strategic government always reneges, and the interest group provides e¤ort if
This occurs when the prior probability that the government is Committed 1 1 This setup corresponds to the standard reputation e¤ects framework. Without multiple types, there is no uncertainty for the interest group. As Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) point out, an alternative approach is to model reputations in a repeated game of complete information with trigger strategies. For example, the interest group could provide funds as long as the government has not reneged on a previous interest group and refuse to provide funds as soon as the government reneges. This approach does not change the set of equilibria and does not capture the idea that reputation corresponds to something the opponents have learned (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998) . 1 2 While altering the de…nition of the Committed type changes some of the speci…c empirical predictions of the model, the basic intuition and result remain the same. The key condition is that the Committed type spends more on the lobby good than the Strategic government would choose to spend in a static setting. As long as interest group e¤ort is conditional on a su¢ ciently high belief that the government is Committed, there exists scope for reputation e¤ects.
exceeds a threshold value:
In the two period case, the Strategic government can Renege in period 1, revealing its type.
The total payo¤ to the government is then d + 0. The government can also Reciprocate in period 1 to build a reputation for commitment. If doing so causes the interest group to provide e¤ort in period 2, the government gets a total payo¤ of c + d. Solving yields the following necessary condition for the Strategic government to Reciprocate:
The Strategic government is willing to Reciprocate in period 1 if doing so induces interest groups to provide funds in period 2. If the condition in equation (2) holds, the equilibrium depends on . This model implies a positive probability of the government reciprocating, thereby spending more on z when it receives a grant than if it followed the income expansion path, as long as the necessary condition given in equation (2) holds.
The model thus predicts systematic violations of fungibility across spending categories consistent with ‡ypaper e¤ects.
Violations of fungibility are more likely when is high (more weight is given to future periods), holding the other parameters …xed. Equation (2) also shows that for a given , the probability that the government Reciprocates is increasing in c d , the ratio of social welfare when the government
Reciprocates to social welfare when the government Reneges. This implies:
We should be more likely to observe violations of fungibility when there are low costs of misallocating toward the lobby good relative to pursuing the socially optimal spending path.
Alternative Models
One alternative theory is that governments spend lobby money on the lobby good because they fear voter punishment if they behave otherwise. Such a model, however, would require either behavioral preferences on the part of voters or a framework in which spending money on the lobby good provides a costly signal of some other characteristic voters care about. Another alternative is a bargaining model between interest groups and politicians. This type of model would need to explain why interest groups are more willing or able to punish the local government when the funds are for "their" good.
I now test some of the predictions of the special interest group model by examining state responses to funds received under a settlement agreement with the tobacco industry. the requirement that the tobacco industry transfer large amounts of money to the states annually in perpetuity. 13 To be eligible to receive funds, each state was required to obtain approval of the settlement from its state court, a process known as achieving state-speci…c …nality. The …rst payments to the states were disbursed when 80% of the states whose shares equaled 80% of total payments reached state-speci…c …nality. This occurred in November 1999, and the …rst payments were released the following month. Settlement revenue is unrestricted and the allocation mechanism and use of funds are left entirely to the discretion of the states.
Payments
States receive three types of payments under the settlement: (1) (Table 1 ) , or $120 billion in present value terms using a discount rate of 4%. 
where SMCD i and AdjDMC i are the smoking-related Medicaid costs and the adjusted direct medical costs for state i.
Negotiations among states at the time of the settlement resulted in some small adjustments to these base percentages. Table 3 illustrates the allocation percentages as they would have been had the above formula been followed as well as the actual percentages under the settlement.
Di¤erences between the simulated and actual allocation percentages may not be completely random (it is unlikely to be a coincidence that California and New York receive exactly the same shares) but are generally very small. The coe¢ cient of correlation between the two is 0.99, and proxying for actual settlement revenues using the simulated allocation percentages does not a¤ect the results.
The size of a state's windfall in a given year is then the aggregate annual payment, determined under the terms of the settlement, multiplied by its allocation percentage. Allocation percentages were …xed at the time of the settlement agreement, so states'spending decisions do not a¤ect future 1 4 The population of each state was categorized into non-smokers, current smokers, former smokers with less than 15 years exposure and former smokers with greater than 15 years exposure. The e¤ect of type of exposure on each smoking-related medical condition and then the level of expenditure was estimated as a function of smoking, medical conditions and health status. The costs do not re ‡ect lifetime medical care costs but rather medical care costs paid for by all sources per year. Models controlled for age, race/ethnicity, poverty status, marital status, education, medical insurance, region, seat-belt use and obesity. See Modisett (1997) for further details on calculations.
revenues. 15 Counties in New York and California receive a share of state settlement payments directly since counties in these states bear a share of Medicaid costs. New York and California state governments therefore receive 51% and 50% of their total state allocations, respectively. 16 Smoking-attributable Medicaid and other health care costs in 1993 are the only systematic determining factors of state settlement revenue receipt. These two factors alone account for over 99% of the variation in settlement revenues if New York and California state revenues are not adjusted for direct payments to counties and over 90% if revenues are adjusted ( Table 4 ) . 17 Running the regression in per capita terms gives an R 2 of 72% when New York and California 
Empirical Methodology and Data

Testing the Main Prediction of the Interest Group Model
The interest group model predicts that when interest groups are instrumental in procuring funds, governments will spend these funds disproportionately on the interest group's preferred goods. In the case of the tobacco settlement, lawsuits were orchestrated largely by state attorneys general with substantial involvement by anti-tobacco and health organizations. A large body of anecdo-tal evidence indicates that these groups felt that settlement dollars should be spent on tobacco prevention and control programs. The following quote is typical: "A compassionate but naïve person would expect the states to use their $246 billion [sic] windfall to try to prevent more people from su¤ ering and dying from cancer, emphysema or other smoking related illnesses. If this is blood money, why not try to stop the bleeding? Ah, but the greedy deal makers in our state capitals have other plans for the money ... I'm talking about construction projects. Paying bills, new non-medical programs ... Most of this spending would be …ne if it came out of state tax revenue, but ... this money should not be poured into general funds. It should be used to help prevent and cure disease." -Judy Jarvis, radio host and lung cancer victim (New York Times, 1999)
I therefore focus my analysis on state spending on tobacco prevention and control programs. In the next sections, I test the predictions of the interest group model more formally.
Econometric Speci…cation
The empirical strategy I employ to test for violations of fungibility is a variation on a traditional …xed e¤ects speci…cation. By exploiting both the time series and cross-sectional variation in settlement revenue receipt, I test for violations of fungibility in two ways. Consider the following regression framework:
where t is a set of year dummies, i is a set of state dummies and X it is a set of time-varying state controls. In a standard …xed e¤ects setting, the key parameter of interest is 1 , which would be interpreted as measuring the e¤ect of settlement revenue receipt on tobacco control spending. t would be included primarily as a control to pick up underlying trends in spending over time.
The tobacco control experiment is unusual in that the pre-trend in tobacco control spending is essentially ‡at and close to zero. A large, discontinuous increase in spending occurs when settlement revenues are received (Figure 1 ). Thus, both 1 and the t 's have causal meaning and can be used to test for violations of fungibility. Coe¢ cients on the time dummies pick up changes in tobacco control spending within a state over time; the …rst test is whether there exists a discontinuity in spending at the time of settlement revenue receipt. The second test is whether the marginal propensity to spend on tobacco control from settlement revenues is higher than the marginal propensity to spend from state income. The relevant test is 1 > 2 (rather than 1 > 0) to distinguish the income e¤ect component of settlement revenue receipt from a true fungibility e¤ect. The t coe¢ cients indicate whether states spent on the lobby good when they received lobby funds and 1 indicates whether states that received more lobby money spent more on the lobby good.
There are two primary identi…cation assumptions. The identifying assumption for t is that spending on tobacco control programs would not have changed from the …scal year before funds were received to the …scal year after in the absence of receipt of settlement funds. The identifying assumption for 1 is that the size of a state's settlement windfall is orthogonal to other state characteristics that might in ‡uence spending on tobacco control programs. The allocation formula does re ‡ect the historical costs of smoking in each state, raising the potential concern that settlement revenue is proxying for the need or desirability of spending money on such programs. I test both identifying assumptions in Section 5.2.
Data
The last comprehensive surveys of state tobacco control spending prior to the settlement were conducted by the Association for State and Territorial Health O¢ cials (ASTHO) in 1994. Data on state spending for …scal years 1996-2000 were collected by the author from individual states. Figure 1 and Figure 2 , only …ve states had substantial tobacco control programs prior to the receipt of settlement funds; the remaining states spent virtually nothing. 20 Settlement revenues received by states were tabulated by the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) and re ‡ect the amount disbursed to each state in a given …scal year. 21 Sources on the remaining variables are given in Appendix A.2. 22 The mean amount allocated toward tobacco control after receipt of settlement funds is a little more than $3.00 per capita. There is substantial variation in allocation amounts across states.
As illustrated in
Results
Main Findings
I test for violations of fungibility by estimating the following equation:
Srev it and Inc it are per capita settlement revenue and income for state i in year t, Af ter is an I …nd strong evidence that states violate fungibility in spending decisions as predicted by the interest group model ( Table 6 ). Column 1 gives the results when state …xed e¤ects are not included.
1 , the propensity to spend from settlement revenue, is 0.18 and signi…cant at the 1% level; 2 , the propensity to spend out of income, is essentially zero and insigni…cant. The average increase in spending upon receipt of settlement funds, ; is 2.93 and also signi…cant at the 1% level. This represents an almost six-fold increase in spending. Adding state …xed e¤ects does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient estimates, as shown in Column 2. In addition, the marginal propensity to spend on tobacco control programs from state income or state government revenue prior to the settlement was essentially zero. The existing ‡ypaper e¤ect literature tends to report the propensity to spend out of grants for programs such as health or education without considering the magnitude of the e¤ect relative to the marginal propensity to spend on those goods from income or state revenue. This raises di¢ culties when attempting to compare the magnitude of ‡ypaper across di¤erent spending categories.
Another possible theory relevant in this particular context is that voters may have learned about the costliness of smoking during the course of the lawsuits. 23 However, states did not increase spending on tobacco control programs during the lawsuits or even after the settlement agreement was reached; spending increased only after the receipt of settlement funds. This discontinuity is di¢ cult to reconcile with a learning story. In addition, I show in the next section that factors which we might expect to in ‡uence spending if states truly learned about the costliness of smoking, such as smoking prevalence or youth smoking rates, have no e¤ect on spending decisions.
Testing the Identifying Assumptions
The identi…cation assumption for the Af ter coe¢ cient is a constant underlying time trend. The identi…cation assumption for the settlement revenue coe¢ cient is that settlement revenues are not proxying for other state characteristics that might in ‡uence tobacco control spending. Such factors cannot explain the discontinuity in spending over time, but must be addressed when using cross-sectional variation in settlement payments across states, particularly since the settlement revenue formula is a function of smoking-related factors.
I test this identi…cation assumption by adding controls for measures of the need for tobacco control programs using data from the post-settlement period with an indicator for whether the state had a large pre-existing program ( Table 7 ) . I control for the percent of the state population that smoked in 1998, state-speci…c minimum spending guidelines recommended by the Centers for Disease Control (for more details see Appendix A.2 ), and the state youth smoking rate in 1997.
These measures have no signi…cant direct e¤ects, no e¤ect on the settlement revenue coe¢ cient, and no additional explanatory power. 24 The results are virtually unchanged when controls for region, youth share and conservativeness of the state are added (column 4).
The possibility remains that states do care about these factors, but in some nonlinear function that is captured by the settlement revenue variable. I therefore examine the direct e¤ect of a variety of indicators of the costliness of smoking without including settlement revenue in the regression (Appendix Table 1 ). Smoking prevalence, state-speci…c minimum spending guidelines recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and youth smoking rates have no signi…cant e¤ects on tobacco control spending.
Robustness Checks
I perform two additional robustness checks: I substitute actual settlement revenues with simulated …gures re ‡ecting the recommended allocation formula and I use NCSL data on tobacco control spending rather than CDC data. The results are given in Table 8 . Both checks result in only slight reductions in the marginal propensity to spend from settlement revenue: the coe¢ cient on per capita settlement revenue is 0.18 when simulated settlement …gures are used and 0.19 when NCSL data are used. Estimates are signi…cant at the 1% level in both cases. The Af ter coe¢ cient drops to 2.05 when the NCSL data are used since these data underestimate spending in the postsettlement period, particularly for states with pre-existing programs in which substantial funding comes from non-settlement revenues. However, despite the downward bias, the coe¢ cient is still large in magnitude and signi…cant at the 1% level. Table 9 presents regression results and Figure 4 and Figure 5 there is no systematic decrease in spending propensity over time. In …scal 2004, spending at the average levels of settlement revenue and income is $1.37 higher than in …scal 1999 in real terms, and the propensity to spend is 0.16. Both e¤ects are signi…cant at the 1% level. Overall, the e¤ects appear to be strongly persistent, at least into the …fth year of fund receipt.
Persistence Over Time
Further Predictions of the Interest Group Model
Interest Group E¤ort
The model I have proposed argues that governments will spend on the lobby good in order to pay back interest groups that exerted e¤ort to procure funds. In the case of the tobacco settlement, interest groups in some states were involved in lawsuits leading up to the settlement. Other states simply signed on to the …nal settlement, receiving windfalls without e¤ort by interest groups. 25 Since these governments do not have interest groups to pay back, we should expect them to treat settlement funds as they would other state income.
I test this prediction empirically by constructing an indicator equal to one if the state did not …le a lawsuit prior to the settlement. Interacting this indicator with settlement revenue and the Af ter indicator, I …nd that states that did not …le lawsuits spent less than states that …led ( Table   10 ). States that …led lawsuits increased average spending by $3.45 after receipt of settlement funds compared with $1.41 for states that did not …le lawsuits, and the di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level. States that did not …le lawsuits also have a propensity to spend of 14 cents on the dollar compared to 23 cents for …ling states, although this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. 26 We might expect states that …led lawsuits to have di¤erent underlying preferences for such
spending. However, we should then see di¤erences in spending between lawsuit and non-lawsuit states prior to the settlement as well as di¤erences in the propensity to spend out of overall income.
I do not observe any such di¤erences (unreported). In addition, any …xed di¤erence across states will be picked up by the state …xed e¤ect. Interacting lawsuit …ling with settlement revenue and the Af ter indicator when state …xed e¤ects are included captures whether or not these states react di¤erently than other states to the receipt of settlement funds relative to other income.
Similar patterns are observed in Lutz's (2004) study of a New Hampshire court-mandated school …nance reform. Although he …nds little evidence of ‡ypaper e¤ects overall, he does …nd that "plainti¤ towns" that …led the suits leading to the court mandate spend signi…cantly more than other municipalities on education upon receipt of the resulting state grants. 27 
Discount Factor
The model predicts that governments that weigh future periods more should spend more on tobacco prevention and control programs. I do not …nd interaction e¤ects of years to the next election or governor's eligibility for re-election on spending (unreported). It is likely that these measures are imperfect proxies for the true discount factor. I argue in the next section that eligibility for re-election, in particular, appears to be picking up political constraints on government rather than the government discount factor.
Political Factors
The model in Section 2 does not consider political agency on the part of the government and I test these predictions by analyzing the e¤ects of political factors on spending in the postsettlement period. 28 I …nd strong evidence in support of the model (Table 11 ). Having a
Republican governor at the time the budget for the …scal year is passed decreases average spending by $1.90 from a base of $4.74 (signi…cant at 10%). Having a Republican governor also decreases the propensity to spend to 5 cents on the dollar from a base of 37 cents on the dollar, and this di¤erence is signi…cant at the 1% level. Note that we do not see di¤ering propensities to spend out of other income, indicating that these results are not being driven solely by di¤erences in the propensity to spend on tobacco control.
I …nd that eligibility for re-election (which should move parties closer to the median voter)
reduces both average spending and the propensity to spend for Democrats and increases both for Republicans (column 2). Similarly, facing an opposition controlled state senate decreases spending for Democrats and increases spending for Republicans, both on average and at the margin (column 3).
These results should be taken with some caution given the relatively small sample size. Nevertheless, the patterns are quite striking and consistent, lending support to the interest group model. As noted in the introduction, there are at least two main caveats to generalizing these results.
First, settlement revenues were not speci…cally labeled for tobacco prevention and control programs, whereas most grants-in-aid are labeled for particular projects. In this model, the relevant factor is not the label of the grant but rather the preference of the interest group that procured the grant.
In practice, these are likely to be the same for most grants-in-aid. The model can thus provide an explanation for cases of classic ‡ypaper e¤ects. Second, the transfers in the settlement are from industry to local government. The same model, however, applies to grants from federal to local governments; if anything, we might expect the links between interest groups and grants to be stronger in the case of intergovernmental grants.
The interest group model would not be as applicable to situations in which there is truly no discretionary component to grants-in-aid. This is rarely the case. As mentioned, a substantial share of intergovernmental grants are allocated on a discretionary basis. In addition, ‡ypaper e¤ects in entitlement programs are generally identi…ed from program expansions. These expansions may be the result of interest group involvement, in which case the incentives outlined in the model would apply. Observed ‡ypaper e¤ects in other contexts, such as in spending by local governments in response to grants from international aid agencies and non-governmental organizations, could also be explained by a similar type of dynamic interaction between local governments and granting agencies. 
FIGURE 1 Settlement States Allocating Funds for Tobacco Control
